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On technology neutral policies for e–identity: A 
critical reflection based on UK identity policy 
Edgar A. Whitley *  
Abstract: This paper reviews the arguments for technology neutral e–identity 
policies.  It uses the recent experience of identity policy in the UK, as well as a 
consideration of technological developments, to distinguish between two perspectives on 
technology neutral policies: legal and technological.  Whilst the legal perspective on 
technology neutrality is intended to provide legal certainty, it fails to address discontinuous 
technological developments such as zero–knowledge systems and risk based assessments of 
identity and attribute claims.  These are transforming the basis of identity policies and 
highlight the challenges of proposing technology neutral identity policies in law.  The paper 
then applies the technological critique of technology neutrality to review a recent study on 
identity, authentication and signature policy in the EU. 
1. Introduction 
For apparently intuitive reasons, many EU regulations and policies in the area of technology and 
communications are intended to be “technology neutral”.  They typically require that “national regulatory 
authorities take the utmost account of the desirability of making regulation technology neutral, that is to 
say that it neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the use of a particular type of technology” (EU, 
2002 para 18).  It is often suggested that this is because policies should be based on general, context–free 
principles rather than instantiations of technology. 
Focussing on specific technologies carries the risk that the technology might change rapidly or 
become obsolete, rendering the associated regulations ineffective and requiring special parliamentary 
time to refresh them.  For example, just as wiretap regulations have had to develop and be redefined as 
interception capabilities moved from alligator clips on copper wires to IP packet sniffing (Diffie & 
Landau, 2009) so regulations on e–mail interception which are based around inspecting SMTP packets 
are problematic in situations where browser–based web–mail predominates (Whitley & Hosein, 2005) or 
lawful access to communications context data is highly dependent on what counts as context and what is 
effectively content (Escudero-Pascual & Hosein, 2004). 
These experiences from the regulation of technology resonate with recent social science thinking on 
science and technology that questions the extent to which technology can meaningfully be seen as a 
distinct area of activity that is separate from social activity (Latour, 1993; Orlikowski, 2010; Suchman, 
2007).  Instead, these scholars seek to understand “how matter comes to matter” (Barad, 2003; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2008), returning the “missing masses” of technology to the policy debate (Latour, 
1992) and taking the specifics of technology seriously (Martin & Whitley, 2012). 
These concerns are particularly important because it is increasingly recognised that the technological 
itself embodies political choices.  Langdon Winner’s classic paper “Do artifacts have politics?” (1980) 
illustrates this with perhaps the most famous example he presents being the “extraordinarily low” 
overpasses on the parkways on Long Island, New York.  Winner suggests these were “deliberately 
designed” by Robert Moses, “to specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on his 
parkways” leaving the parkways (and beaches) free for the “automobile owning whites of ‘upper’ and 
‘comfortable middle’ classes” (pp. 123–124).  (Although see, Woolgar and Cooper (1999).) 
In some cases, political and social choices may be explicitly designed into regulations about 
technology to encourage or discourage their uptake.  As an example, the UK has recently introduced a 
“digital by default” policy, the intention of which is both to provide better services for citizens and to 
deliver gross annual savings of more than £1.3 billion (Cabinet Office, 2010).  Winner’s analysis, 
however, warns us that some political decisions may be hidden within apparently neutral propositions, 
such as the design of parkways.  In other cases, the political consequences may be entirely autonomous of 
individual decision–makers (Winner, 1977) but still need appropriate oversight.  In this context, claims 
that a policy is technology neutral and based around general principles need to be treated with suspicion 
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as it might, in fact, reveal precisely the kinds of politics that Winner identified.  e–identity policy is one 
such area where claims for technology neutrality are frequently made. 
Recent UK experiences around identity policies will be used to explore potential limitations of 
technology neutral policies.  The unique features of the UK case make explicit a range of technological 
assumptions that are hidden in more conventional or less problematic national identity policies (e.g. see 
discussion of implicit assumptions in Cormack, 2012) and provide a useful basis for evaluating the scope 
and applicability of technology neutral policies and highlight a distinctive technological viewpoint on this 
issue, a viewpoint that extends the existing legal discourse surrounding technology neutral policies.  The 
paper then analyses a recent study on identity and authentication services (IAS) (IAS Project, 2011b) 
from this perspective. 
The paper begins by reviewing the recent UK identity policy, starting with the recently abandoned 
National Identity Scheme, as legislated for in the Identity Cards Act 2006.  It was claimed that the 
Identity Cards Act was technology neutral, ‘enabling’ legislation that would not restrict the development 
of identity policy.  However, it will be argued that key design choices were hard–coded into the 
legislation.  The UK Coalition Government’s alternative Identity Assurance programme will then be 
briefly presented to illustrate how many similar goals can be achieved in very different ways.  The paper 
next reviews the legal arguments used to support technology neutral policy based around general, 
context–free principles.  This is followed by technological consideration of the same issue including some 
recent examples of technology–based innovations that offer privacy–friendly identity solutions that do not 
fit within the existing general principles of e–identity policy.  The paper then uses this perspective to 
assess critically the IAS proposals before ending with a discussion of the implications of this perspective 
on e–identity policy more generally. 
2. The UK Identity Cards Act: Enabling legislation or wiring in design choices? 
In 2005, the Labour Government presented plans to introduce identity cards to the UK for the first time 
since the Second World War (Agar, 2005).  The National Identity Scheme (“the Scheme”) would include 
the use biometrics and would be based on a centralised National Identity Register (“the Register”) 
containing the identity details of all UK citizens and residents as well as an audit trail detailing whenever 
identity claims were verified against the Register.  Whilst this audit trail would be useful to citizens 
seeking to query particular transactions, it also opened up the possibility of surreptitious surveillance of 
citizens by state agencies (e.g. Lyon, 2009). 
To support the Scheme, the government introduced primary legislation in the form of the Identity 
Cards Bill, which, after a controversial passage through Parliament (see Whitley & Hosein, 2010a) 
became law in 2006 (Wadham et al., 2006). 
Throughout the Parliamentary debate about the legislation Home Office Ministers repeatedly 
emphasized the fact that the Bill was ‘enabling legislation’ that would “allow” a National Identity System 
based on identity cards to be introduced.  As a result, they stated that there was “much still to be done in 
terms of detail, regulations and all the other elements” [Tony McNulty, 28 June 2005 : Column 1253]. 
Many of the details of the Scheme were not included in the Act, with these details being left to 
secondary legislation and statutory instruments.  The use of secondary legislation is not without its critics 
as, in practice, the debates about them are often poorly attended and so effective scrutiny of the details of 
the Scheme could be limited, raising the prospect of what Conservative MP Edward Garnier described as 
“legislation by statutory instrument” [18 October 2005 : Column 804]. 
The absence of such important technological details in “enabling legislation” makes it particularly 
difficult for Parliament “to scrutinise the proposed measures effectively” (Constitution Committee, 2009 
Recommendation Paragraph 474). 
Regardless of these practical considerations, one of the main arguments in favour of “enabling 
legislation” is that it allows for a “technology neutral” policy as “it may be counter–productive to adjust 
current regulation incrementally” (Lusoli & Compañó, 2010).  Rather than specifying in legislation what 
technological measures might need to be put in place, this form of legislation allows for these details to be 
added at a later stage, such as during the procurement process. 
Nevertheless, achieving the appropriate level of non–specific detail can be problematic.  For example, 
the final version of the Act states that an individual may be required to allow “his fingerprints, and other 
biometric information about himself, to be taken and recorded” thus both leaving some details to be added 
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at the procurement stage (will face and iris biometrics be used?) whilst also specifying that fingerprint 
biometrics will be used by the Scheme. 
The Act further confuses the distinction between technology neutral legislation and legislation with 
specific design implications in the role of the Register.  Thus, whilst the Act does not completely specify 
all of the biometrics to be stored by Government, it does specify that the Secretary of State “establish and 
maintain a register of individuals” (s.1(2)) that includes “information about occasions on which 
information recorded about him in the Register has been provided to any person” (s.1(5)(i)) (i.e. the audit 
trail mentioned above).  Schedule 1 (6) of the Act also specifies other audit details that are recorded on 
the Register. 
This is a very detailed (political) design specification for the Scheme and its operation.  Whilst 
nominally neutral about the technology it actually implies a very particular way in which the Scheme 
would be used in practice—one that enhances the powers of the state and downplays the rights of privacy 
for citizens.  For example, it strongly suggests identity verification based on a centralising approach to 
identity management that involves verifying details such as biometrics against those stored on the 
Register when confirming someone’s identity.  This process would also involve creating an associated 
audit trail record. 
In contrast, the legislation appears to rule out formal use of identity verification simply against details 
held on the card, with no audit trail record created.  The reasons for this design decision have never been 
disclosed however an internal “benefits overview” document (Home Office, 2005) noted that the Scheme 
(and particularly, the centralised database of fingerprint biometrics stored on the Register) would improve 
the ability of police to detect crime by “increasing the likelihood of matching marks from scenes of crime.  
There are currently 900,000 outstanding crime scene marks on police databases”.  This point was repeated 
by then Prime Minister Tony Blair in a newspaper article (Blair, 2006) suggesting that such secondary 
uses of the identity database may well have been officially sanctioned. 
The government’s proposals for identity cards proved to be unpopular with fewer than 15,000 cards 
issued by 2010.  Indeed, much of the media coverage of the Scheme was very critical of the proposals 
(Pieri, 2009; Whitley, 2009) and, following the General Election in May 2010 (when only the Labour 
Party was still supporting the proposals (Whitley & Hosein, 2010c)), the new Coalition Government 
scrapped the whole scheme, physically destroying the National Identity Register and introducing the 
Identity Documents Act (2010) that repealed the Identity Cards Act. 
The challenge of effective identity policies, for example for accessing government services online, did 
not disappear with the election of a new government and since May 2010 the UK Cabinet Office has been 
developing identity assurance (IdA) policies.  A report by Sir James Crosby for then Chancellor Gordon 
Brown provided a useful distinction between identity management and identity assurance whereby 
‘identity management’ suggests data sharing and database consolidation, concepts which principally serve 
the interests of the owner of the database, for example the Government or the banks whereas ‘identity 
assurance’ is a consumer–led concept, a process that meets an important consumer need without 
necessarily providing any spin–off benefits to the owner of any database (Sir James Crosby, 2008). 
The IdA programme embodies its own political assumptions, not least the realpolitik that any UK 
identity policy must now align with the policy commitments of supporting privacy and citizen 
empowerment that formed the basis of the election manifestos of both coalition partners.  In particular, it 
means that the UK identity policy will not be based around a government held register of identities (i.e. 
the National Identity Register by another name (Maude, 2012)).  Instead, the provision of identity 
assurance services has been moved entirely to the private sector, through commercial identity providers 
such as the Post Office, banks, mobile phone providers, etc.  Government departments then become 
consumers of these identity services (via a distributed hub that enhances privacy by explicitly breaking 
the link between the identity provider and the government service).  In addition, because the government 
is keen to develop a thriving marketplace of identity providers, it has told industry that it will not enter the 
market place itself. 
Although the private sector will be providing the identity assurance services, the government provides 
oversight of the overall process.  For example, it has issued a series of “Good practice guides” that detail 
the requirements for the secure delivery of online public services, for authentication credentials and the 
means of validating and verifying the identity of an individual in support of online services (Cabinet 
Office, 2012). 
The particular configuration of the UK’s identity assurance programme reveals a series of 
technological assumptions that are often implicit in other countries’ identity policies, where the state 
plays a key role as an identity provider.  In this configuration, the state is no longer an identity provider—
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instead it becomes an attribute verifier for important, state–based attributes such as citizenship, 
entitlement to social security benefits, etc.  As the consumer of identity services that require minimum 
security levels, the state specifies the requirements that identity providers must meet in order to be 
qualified to provide those identity services (Cabinet Office, 2012).  In so doing, it makes explicit the 
considerations of ‘trust’ that previously existed (or didn’t exist) between different government 
departments and the data they provided when “the Government” was itself the identity provider (Lips, 
2012; Wilton, 2012). 
3. The legal view of technology neutral policies 
A recent paper by Koops (2006) provides a useful review of many of the legal arguments put forward for 
using technology neutral policies “as a starting point”.  Koops’ analysis starts with the classic concern 
that technology specific regulation might rapidly become out of date or obsolete (Bennett Moses, 2011).  
He also notes that at times of technological “turbulence” legal certainty is a reasonable desire of 
regulators and industry.  Using the example of in–line skates (are skaters ‘pedestrians’ or ‘cyclists’?), he 
highlights the challenge of defining categories and the need to be able to revise categories as new 
technologies emerge (Bowker & Star, 1999; Marche, 1991; Whitley et al., 1989). 
Koops then provides a series of different categories of what is meant by technology neutral policies.  
The first of these is whether the policy should be neutral in terms of how it is formulated or in terms of its 
effect, with most cases focussing on technology neutral effects that might feed back to technology neutral 
formulations.   Reed (2007) describes this as technology indifference and gives the example of copyright 
law applying whether a copyrighted work was communicated by e–mail or by semaphore flags.  There are 
also clear parallels here with regards to ongoing debates around network neutrality and associated privacy 
concerns (Cooper, 2011; Ohm, 2010b). 
A variation of this concern about the purpose of technology regulation argues that what holds off–line 
should also hold on–line—paraphrased by Reed (2007) as implementation neutrality (i.e. the regulation 
should be neutral about whether the process is implemented via digital technology or not).  This is 
perhaps most clearly seen in regulations about the introduction of e–signatures which are explicitly 
intended to ‘neutralise’ the organisational choice between e–signatures and wet–ink signatures.  e–
signatures appear frequently in legal discussions of technology neutral policies (Ali, 2009; Koops, 2006; 
Reed, 2007). 
In terms of the consequences of regulation, another variation of technology neutrality (and one which 
features heavily in debates about network neutrality) is that regulation should not discriminate against 
certain technologies, but should also not hinder the development of particular technologies.  Reed (2007) 
calls this potential neutrality.  In this latter sense, Zittrain’s arguments about generativity (Zittrain, 2008) 
are particularly relevant. 
A third theme in Koops’ classification focuses on technology neutrality as a legislative technique that 
allows laws to be sufficiently sustainable in order to provide certainty but also explicit about which 
technologies they are intended to cover (and why) so that whenever there are fundamental changes to the 
technology it is possible to trigger a revision in the law. 
Variations of this approach include the use of ‘enabling’ legislation and secondary legislation / 
statutory instruments to present and update the details of the legislation as was the case for the UK 
Identity Cards Act. 
4. A technological view of technology neutral policies 
Reed (2007), among others, notes that potential neutrality might be undermined by changing business 
models associated with the use of new technologies.  In this context, he discusses the problems faced by 
e–money initiatives given that the associated EU Directive defines electronic money as value which is 
“stored on an electronic device” nothing that this fails to differentiate between the payment and credit 
activities that e–money could facilitate.  Nevertheless, he claims that it is possible to “futureproof” 
regulations so that “these laws are still capable of applying in spite of the changes in technology” (Reed, 
2007 p. 276).  Arguably this view carries an implicit essentialist assumption that there are particular 
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attributes of a technology that are “essential to achieve the legal results that the regulator is aiming for” 
(Reed, 2007 p. 276). 
Such essentialist perspectives on technology (Grint & Woolgar, 1997) have been called into question 
in a range of cases (e.g. Cadili & Whitley, 2005) where, time and again, it is the specifics of the 
technology that are significant, not generalisable and generalised principles or attributes. 
Data protection laws are frequently cited as a classic example of technology neutral policies that are 
based on such essential principles.  National data protection laws in Europe, such as the UK’s Data 
Protection Act (1998), are local transpositions of the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.  This is 
itself based on a series of earlier best practice guidelines that were frequently presented in terms of a 
series of ‘principles’ of data protection. 
In the early 1970s “Fair Information Practices” emerged from a report published by the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare 
(HEW), 1973).  These principles are technology–independent procedural guarantees which attempt to 
balance the rights of individuals with those of organizations. 
The HEW Fair Information Practices were developed further in a document produced by the OECD in 
1980 (OECD, 1980).  The document was explicitly designed as a response to the “development of 
automatic data processing, which enables vast quantities of data to be transmitted within seconds across 
national frontiers, and indeed across continents” and was presented in terms of “a consensus on basic 
principles which can be built into existing national legislation, or serve as a basis for legislation in those 
countries which do not yet have it”. 
Within Europe similar considerations gave rise to the introduction of the Council of Europe 
Convention of 1981 that provided, in turn, the impetus for the first UK Data Protection Act in 1984.  A 
decade later, the EU revised its stance on data protection with a new directive (EU, 1995) and has done so 
again with proposals to replace the data protection directive with a new regulation (EU, 2012a; EU, 
2012b). 
The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) presents the UK Data Protection Act in terms of 
eight Data Protection Principles (Information Commissioner's Office, 2011) and a recent technical report 
on the Data Protection Directive sponsored by the ICO noted that one of the main strengths of the 
directive was the fact that it was “flexible due to a principles–based framework” and that it was 
“technology neutral”, making “no reference to specific technologies” and that its “concept of personal 
data was broad enough to be technologically neutral” (Robinson et al., 2009 p. 22). 
Nevertheless, recent opinions by the EU Article 29 Working Party call into question the ongoing 
usefulness of the technology neutral principles underlying the directive.  For example, online services like 
social networking sites such as Facebook call into question the distinction between data controller and 
data processor (Article 29 Data protection working party, 2010).  In the mainframe era, when the data 
protection principles were first formulated, technological considerations meant that the distinction was 
clear.  However, as the Working Party notes: 
 
Social network service providers provide online communication platforms which enable 
individuals to publish and exchange information with other users.  These service 
providers are data controllers, since they determine both the purposes and the means of 
the processing of such information.  The users of such networks, uploading personal 
data also of third parties, would qualify as controllers provided that their activities are 
not subject to the so–called ‘household exception’ (Article 29 Data protection working 
party, 2010 p. 23). 
Other concerns have been raised by the Working Party when exploring what should be considered to 
be ‘personal data’, particularly in relation to search engines and their retention of IP addresses (Article 29 
Data protection working party, 2008), see also (Pounder, 200) and questions of re–identification more 
generally (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2010; O'Hara et al., 2011; Ohm, 2010a). 
Whilst it is possible to categorise these changes in terms of the evolution of underlying business 
models, there are also technological developments that produce a much sharper discontinuity from the 
existing ways of doing things.  A number of such discontinuities can be found in the area of e–identity 
and are discussed more fully in the next section. 
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5. Technology specific alternatives for e–identity 
The argument for general principles underlying technology neutral policies presumes a linear innovation 
path (or a Kuhnian “normal science”) where technological developments refine and enhance existing 
technologies.  In the case of identity related technologies, this assumption of linearity is no longer valid.  
Work in cryptographic areas by researchers such as Stefan Brands (Brands, 2000) and others (Auerbach, 
2004; Deswarte & Gambs, 2009; Engberg, 2004) offers a Kuhnian paradigm shift in terms of our thinking 
about identity.  As privacy policy expert Caspar Bowden notes, “Since about 1997 we have known that a 
viable solution is mathematically (really) anonymous credentials, transacted over onion routing, and 
fleshed out in projects such a PRIME. All these transactions can be done mathematically privately and 
even audit and performance statistics can be collected (perfectly) privately.  Indeed, this is precisely what 
cryptographic and privacy engineering was invented for, and without it ‘trusted’ parties unnecessarily 
collect log data which can track a whole nation in a transactional surveillance grid”. 
Some, such as privacy and security expert Stephan Engberg (2011), suggest that the use of these 
cryptographic techniques can transform modern society, enabling individual citizens to reassert 
meaningful control over their personal data, effecting a sophisticated form of informational self–
determination (cf Hornung & Schnabel, 2009).  In Engberg’s view, liberal democracy in the digital age 
“will depend on digital structures that by default are not able to distinguish (end–to–end across purposes) 
between two transactions by the same person / device and two transactions by two different entities”. 
Whilst there are practical questions to be addressed in transforming existing identity infrastructures 
and services to operate in this way (most public services still use “names” as important (secondary) 
identifiers for the citizens they interact with, not least because that simplifies the customer experience in 
case of problems with the transaction), arguably a technologically sophisticated country like the UK (and 
particularly one without legacy centralised identity systems to integrate with) should be looking forward 
to technologically sophisticated, citizen–centric systems rather than relying on “rear–view mirror” 
perspectives that, intentionally or not, incorporate technologically unnecessary surveillance capabilities. 
Even without moving to the sophistication of systems such as these, there are other forms of 
technological innovations that do not sit well with the ‘general principles’ of identity management.  For 
example, biometric technologies are widely considered to be essential components of secure, robust and 
dependable identity assurance, especially in today’s interlinked digital economy where passwords and 
PINs no longer suffice as a strong means of user authentication. 
However, thinking of biometrics in technology neutral terms (“a means of identifying someone”) 
rather than a means of linking claims to a person has a number of risks, not least in terms of biometric 
failures. 
In her recent book, Shoshana Magnet (2011) reviews the very real ways in which biometric systems 
can fail.  These failures are “failures to meet basic standards of objectivity and neutrality in their 
application, and the failure to adequately conceive of the human subjects and identities that are their 
purported objects” (p. 2).  That is, “these new identification technologies suffer from ‘demographic 
failures’, in which they reliably fail to identify particular segments of the population.  That is, even 
though they are sold as able to target markets and sell products to people specifically identified on the 
basis of their gender and race identities, instead these technologies regularly overtarget, fail to identify 
and exclude particular communities” (p. 5). 
She notes that “biometric technologies that rely on erroneous assumptions about the biological nature 
of race, gender, and sexuality produce unbiometrifiable bodies, resulting in individuals who are denied 
their basic human rights to mobility, employment, food and housing”  (p. 151). 
Another risk associated with an uncritical acceptance of biometrics in technologically neutral terms is 
that of closing down opportunities for innovation—opportunities which companies such as Touch2id 
have been exploring. 
Touch2id is a private organisation (http://www.touch2id.co.uk) that has been operating its biometric 
age–verification scheme in Wiltshire, UK since January 2010 in partnership with Wiltshire Council, NHS 
PCT, Police, Licensing Authority and Trading Standards officials. 
Touch2id seeks to use the principles of data minimization and minimal disclosure to use biometric 
data in a privacy–friendly and effective manner.  These principles call for systems that store and reveal 
the minimum amount of personal data for the transaction at hand.  It provides a proof–of–age card, NFC 
service or mobile phone ‘sticker’ for 18–25 year olds that uses a single fingerprint sensor instead of a 
picture to confirm the claim that a person is 18 or over.  It does not need to store personal details like 
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name, date–of–birth, gender or address, operates free of a central database and does not capture and store 
a fingerprint at enrolment or during authentication. 
Diversifying from biometric–based access control systems, Touch2id was set up in 2008 to develop a 
unique, database–free solution for proof–of–age for the UK.  The technology harnesses the latest multi–
spectral fingerprint sensors which can read the fingerprint from below the epidermis (overcoming typical 
performance failures in the field due to dirty or damaged fingerprints) and the emerging use of contactless 
smart–card technology, such as London’s Oyster card and NFC–enabled smart phones.  The unique 
aspect of the technology, which has been developed in the UK with overseas OEM partners, is a 
database–free application that stores only a unique code created from the fingerprint, using a process 
known as minutiae mapping.  That is, the fingerprint itself is never captured and the approach therefore 
minimises the risks of unrevokable biometrics (e.g. Ratha et al., 2007). 
Having enrolled with Touch2id (which involves generating the unique fingerprint code and storing it 
on the credential alongside a verified date–of–birth and other system information), the young person is 
free to use this credential to prove their age.  For example, when entering a bar, they present their 
credential to a reader device and present their fingerprint on the reader, where a second code is generated 
from the presented fingerprint.  If the codes match and the date–of–birth stored on the chip confirms that 
the person is over–18 on that day, a green light flashes and sound is generated confirming that the person 
is over–18. 
Touch2id therefore provides a form of zero–knowledge proof for the claim that an individual is over 
18.  It does so without revealing anything other than the veracity of that claim.  The bar owner checking 
whether someone is over 18 can do so with a sufficient level of assurance in this claim (the date–of–birth 
has been verified and the person presenting the credential is the person that it was issued to) without 
having (or needing) to know the individual’s name, address, gender or date–of–birth and without 
generating an archival record of who visited which bars when. 
Both Touch2id and the cryptographic approaches outlined above raise serious questions about the 
notion of technology neutral e–identity policies.  They offer zero–knowledge proofs and are not based on 
databases or transactional surveillance grids.  Whilst, of course, these technologies could be presented 
using their own technology neutral vocabulary, finding a form of general principles that incorporates both 
these technologies and the existing identity management techniques found in the marketplace at present 
would be difficult. 
6. From identifiability to levels of assurance 
In parallel to the development of innovative technologies, another theme that is being adopted in the UK 
as elsewhere is an explicit move from the idea of ‘perfect identifiability’ to a risk–based perspective 
based on required levels of assurance.  Just as the bar owner does not need to know the name of the 
customer only— whether they are over 18—in many cases so–called identification claims are actually 
authentication claims (Whitley & Hosein, 2010b).  That is, a relying party in the interaction must be able 
to assess the likelihood that the person they are interacting with legitimately has the attributes they claim 
(Cabinet Office, 2012). As in the case of Touch2id, this attribute might be a claim to be over 18, or being 
allergic to penicillin or, for online interactions, a ‘real person’ to move past ‘captcha’ screens. 
Some of these claims might be self–asserted (such as allergies, or avatar name), others might be 
backed by a level of assurance provided by a commercial identity provider (a credit reference agency 
might provide support for claims of credit worthiness) whilst others might require particularly high levels 
of assurance, for example, claims that a person is a UK citizen and hence entitled to a British passport, or 
has no criminal record history and is therefore eligible to work with vulnerable people. 
Such a risk–based perspective, if followed through logically and taking advantage of recent 
developments in computational computer science and cryptography, potentially removes the need to use 
identities for many transactions at all.  For example, payments to an online store are currently based 
around the customer sending their bank details and other personal data to the store (which acts as the 
relying party for the financial part of the transaction; symmetrically, the customer is also a relying party 
in terms of the claim that the store will deliver the purchased goods or services).  However, logically, all 
that is required is for the online store to receive an assertion (or guarantee) from the customer’s bank that 
the bank will cover the claimed payment (once, for that amount at (around) that time / date).  If the 
customer makes another online transaction to a different store, a new one–off guarantee would be issued 
  
 
  
  
On technology neutral policies for e–identity: A critical reflection based on UK identity policy 
 
  
 
 
141 
 
to this new relying party by the bank.  Each online store is able to process the payment securely without 
ever needing to know who the customer was and without the need to receive, and store securely, the 
customer’s data.  A public demonstration of this capability is available at: (Trusted Attribute Aggregation 
Service Demonstration, 2011). 
This perspective, informed by recent developments in technology raise important concerns about 
arguments for technology neutral policies based on general principles.  The next section uses this 
perspective to review recent proposals on identity policies for the EU. 
7. A study on identification, authentication and signature (IAS) policy  
Recent work financed by the European Commission studies the feasibility of a comprehensive EU legal 
framework that would apply to electronic assertions needed to secure electronic transactions as well as the 
ancillary services needed to use them: electronic identification, authentication, signature, seals and 
certified delivery.  The objective would be to facilitate the smooth working of electronic transactions in 
the internal market (IAS Project, 2011b). 
The draft of the first IAS deliverable echoes the EU’s Digital Agenda (EU, 2010) by explicitly stating 
that “the policy goals that an IAS approach should cover, including such aspects as the enabling of the 
internal market, technological neutrality and legal reliability” (IAS Project, 2011a emphasis added). 
The study makes many useful recommendations, particularly around the challenges of electronic 
signatures for the internal market (where the question of being technology neutral between paper and 
electronic signatures across national boundaries becomes significant).  However, there are a number of 
elements where the attempts to be ‘technology neutral’ from a legal perspective undermine the benefits of 
the proposals from a technological one. 
Given Engberg’s assertion that it should be possible to design systems that are unable to distinguish 
between two transactions by the same person / device and two transactions by two different entities, many 
of the claims about uniqueness and identifiability made in the IAS study bear further scrutiny.  For 
example, when discussing Electronic Identity Establishment the report argues that enrolment “relates 
those (identity) attributes to a primary key (electronic identity primary key, i.e. an identifier consisting in 
itself a Unique Identity) for later retrieval”.  It continues: “There is typically a repository or database that 
may be centralised or decentralised in nature” (IAS Project, 2011a p. 23 emphasis added).  As noted 
above, no such repository or database should be needed, nor should it be necessary (or even desirable) to 
try to identify or define a ‘unique identity’. 
This focus on unique identification also affects the description of biometrics, where the report 
presents the wish that: “in the ideal world there would be a technology providing some inimitable unique 
identity (IUI) to every natural person”.  This IUI would have the properties of being “a Unique Identity of 
the entity it is related to; 100% unique to that entity; derived from biometric properties with 100% 
reliability for a lifetime; be as short as possible” (IAS Project, 2011a p. 25).  Empirical studies of 
biometrics have shown how dependent they are on all sorts of contextual factors, including the 
technology used to capture the biometric image (Bowyer et al., 2009; Magnet, 2011).  In addition there 
are important conceptual questions about what uniqueness means in any particular context (Cole, 2009).  
Moreover, as the UK Identity Assurance Programme shows, it is possible (through the use of required 
levels of assurance) to allow individuals to use multiple credentials, from multiple identity assurance 
providers with different levels of assurance rather than requiring the system to fixate on some inimitable 
unique identity that is used for all identity related transactions regardless of the required level of 
assurance. 
The report states that “the current state–of–the–art can certainly rely on the concept of Unique Identity 
… while trying to evolve towards Inimitable Unique Identity in the future”. The intention is to link this 
unique identity, through a one–way function, to a Unique Identity Derivation “a special type of electronic 
identity primary key as named above, i.e. a special unique identifier consisting in itself a Unique Identity 
of the entity it is related to” (IAS Project, 2011a p. 25). 
Moreover, even this disguised identity derivation is, according to the study, intended to be used by 
Identity Attribute Assertion Providers who assign identity attributes to persons in a way that would 
“ideally be 100% in the context of an official Governmental identification scheme but may vary between 
different levels in more relaxed market or business or social application domains” (IAS Project, 2011a p. 
26). 
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Achieving close to 100% certainty in a unique identity is always a costly process, particularly because 
of the opportunities for fraud that are opened up if an unique identity is incorrectly assigned. Moreover, in 
addition to the removal of a technological need for 100% identifiability, a risk–based perspective also 
reduces the emphasis on 100% certainty, instead any service provider (whether public or private sector) 
needs to assess the level of assurance it requires from an identity provider and these will clearly vary from 
context to context (Cabinet Office, 2012). 
For example, the report gives a number of use cases where entity authentication is seen as “a process 
of establishing an acceptable level of assurance that a claimed identity is genuine” (IAS Project, 2011a p. 
28).   However, many of the use cases do not actually require identity, only support for the claims being 
made.  That is, many are transactions that could easily be achieved through a form of pseudonymity rather 
than identity.  These are transactions where the relying party does not need to know ‘who’ they are 
dealing with, only that they have the required attributes—see Error! Reference source not found. for an 
analysis of these use cases. 
 
 
            Table 1 Identification Use Cases (IAS Project 2011a, pp.28-29 
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In many of the use cases, pseudonymous transactions based on attributes are feasible and possibly 
desirable.  These transactions are not truly anonymous, rather they are cases where the pseudonymity of 
the transaction is maintained by the identity provider that is supporting the claims.  That is, if my bank 
knows that I am credit worthy then it should be able to support my claim to make be able to make 
purchases online (for example by issuing me with a credit card for online purchases), even if the relying 
party sees my (pseudonymous) name (“Mickey Mouse”) rather than my real name.  If a transaction is 
believed to be fraudulent, it may become necessary to break the pseudonymisation and the identity 
provider will be able to do this, on presentation of a suitably authorised ‘search’ warrant. 
Another example given in the study is where social networks or other service providers are used to 
support attribute assertions and the example of a mobile phone number and a phone bill is used to identify 
and authenticate a person applying for a bank loan.  Once again, this example confuses two things, 
identifying the person and supporting their suitability for credit.  Whilst mobile phone SIM cards are 
regulated in some countries (i.e. they can only be sold on presentation of official identification 
documents) in others there is no such restriction.  Indeed, it is possible to buy SIM cards in UK airports 
(both airside and terminal side) from automatic dispensers, for cash. 
The discussion of e–signature types again reveals some technological assumptions, which originate in 
the previous e–signatures directive (EU, 1999).  In the original directive, an ‘advanced electronic 
signature’ means an electronic signature which satisfies various requirements, such as being uniquely 
linked to the signatory and is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control.  
However it also states that an ‘advanced electronic signature’ “(b) is capable of identifying the signatory”. 
As the discussion of technological developments presented above has shown, it is now possible to 
implement functionality which addresses all the requirements of advanced electronic signatures and more, 
but which either are capable of pseudonymously identifying the signatory or which do not need to 
identify the signatory at all to maintain their utility.  As such, simply restating this particular requirement 
highlights the technological dangers of ‘technology neutral’ policies. 
8. Concluding discussion 
The examples presented in the paper suggest that the unqualified support for technology neutral policy for 
e–identity needs to be reconsidered.  Developments in technology as well as innovative business models 
that are explicitly designed to be privacy–friendly have the potential to reshape the very form of e–
identity policy.  As such, the ‘general principles’ underlying e–identity have been subject to a paradigm 
shift and it is difficult to reconcile the new principles of e–identity with those found in earlier 
technologies.  Whilst it is possible to formulate new general principles, a more straightforward response 
might be to recognise that general principles or technology neutral policies should be restricted to being a 
starting point rather than a desirable end point.  That is, in line with Koops’ potential neutrality 
technology specific regulations should be reviewed regularly to ensure that they are not unnecessarily 
distorting the market and innovation opportunities by supporting or restricting particular developments 
(Bennett Moses, 2011). 
It also suggests that technology neutrality is not a simple binary choice—these regulations are 
technology neutral / those are not.  Instead, technology neutrality might end up being more a question of 
degree. 
A related concern with technologically neutral policy in practice is that it shifts detailed, technology–
specific decisions to secondary legislation, statutory instruments and their equivalents.  Although, in 
principle, such mechanisms are entirely appropriate, in practice they face far less parliamentary scrutiny 
even though they may have far greater practical implications.  This unintended consequence of the 
neutrality argument, where detailed considerations are made by unnamed technocrats and civil servants 
rather than the elected legislature, is inherently problematic and open to abuse.  Similar problems arise 
when these issues are transferred to international standards bodies that claim to act on behalf of citizens. 
Technology neutral policies also raise significant concerns for techno–legal integration across EU 
member states.  The certainty about legal and technical interoperability can only be achieved by being 
specific about technology and regulations.  Failing to do so might achieve political agreement but runs the 
risk of low levels of take–up and adoption. 
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By removing the state from being an identity provider, the UK experience brings to the forefront 
questions of liability that might remain implicit if the state is intimately involved in both the issuing and 
use of identity credentials. 
The technology alternatives presented in this paper are particularly amenable to user–centric 
considerations.  Rather than being restricted to a single identity provider (the state), UK citizens are 
intended to be able to take more control over their identity credentials, organising them in ways which 
support their own needs rather than those of the state.  For example, a citizen may choose to use some one 
credential for work–related activities, another for family and household identity claims, a third for their 
hobbies etc.  Moreover, the technologies discussed above allow for various forms of anonymous (e.g. 
Touch2id) and pseudonymous actions.  These will have knock–on effects on legal models (and liability), 
particularly in the case of zero–knowledge proofs.  What underlying law should apply if a zero–
knowledge proof is used?  Who is liable in cases of dispute? 
Koops ends his review by asking four questions when thinking of using technology neutral regulation 
“as a starting point”: What is the goal of the regulation?  Is it desirable to control technology?  What level 
of legal certainty is required? And how urgent is the need for regulation? 
In the context of e–identity policies it is clear that the goal of regulation should not be to provide 
equivalence between online and offline worlds.  Indeed, as was shown in the paper, recent technological 
developments offer the opportunity for enhancing privacy whilst supporting identity claims in ways that 
have no meaningful equivalence in offline worlds. 
The role of a market of identity providers in the UK programme highlights the tension between the 
need to control, at one level, both the companies and the services they provide, while explicitly not 
restricting new, innovative companies from entering the market place.  The associated level of legal 
certainty is therefore provided by the accreditation schemes associated with becoming an authorised 
identity provider that can provide identity services to public service providers. 
What each of these examples has shown is that in addition to legal concerns about the applicability of 
technology neutral policies there are increasingly important technological concerns that limit this 
applicability.  If e–identity, and similar technologically sophisticated services, are to succeed we need to 
reflect critically on the assumption that technology neutral policies are the most effective way forward. 
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